American Entry into the War
Historians have disagreed continuously over which factor proved decisive in prompting the United States to abandon neutrality in 1917. Arguments privileging financial ties to the Allies, concerns about German aggression, or Wilson's desire to shape the peace have all found advocates throughout the twentieth century. The general contours of each position took shape in the 1920s and 1930s, although subsequent generations of scholars added important nuances amid new evidence. During the interwar period many Americans believed that entering the war had been a mistake. Helmut C. Engelbrecht and Frank C. Hanighen, Merchants of Death; a Study of the International Armament Industry (Ludwig von Mises Institute, 1934) charged that American bankers and capitalists (dubbed the "merchants of death") had tricked the nation into fighting to ensure repayment of their private loans to the Allies. Other historians rejected this conspiracy theory while still accepting that the economic benefits of war-related trade gradually pulled America into the war. 1 In this formulation Wilson's desire to keep the shipping lanes open between the United States and Britain prompted him to accept the British blockade while demanding that
The third predominant explanation for U.S. entry into the war highlights Wilson's desire to play a leading role in reshaping postwar international relations around the principles of self-determination, open trade, and collective security. Wilson's supporters have tended to view his fervent attempts to create a new world order as an example of American humanitarianism. Wilson's detractors lament his paternalistic urge to remake the world in the image of the United States. All underscore the lasting influence of Wilson's ideals on twentieth century foreign policy. In Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (N.Y. Garden City, Doubleday, 1922 ), Wilson' s press secretary Ray Stannard Baker described Wilson as an idealist who wanted to give the United States a new international role spreading democracy and capitalism. This perspective still has adherents, such as Wilson biographer John Milton Cooper, Jr., who puts a positive spin on Wilson's activist personality. Cooper, Jr. contends that by 1917 Wilson had come to believe that the United States needed to take an active part in the fighting to earn a leading role at the peace table. 7 Wilson's critics depict him at best as naïve, and at worst as cloaking American imperial ambitions in democratic rhetoric. 8 In the late 1950s and 1960s, many historians viewed Wilson's war goals as laying the groundwork for future American involvement into areas of the world that did not directly affect national security. Arno J. Mayer, Political Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917 -1918 (Yale University Press, 1959 ) emphasized Wilson's success in blunting the appeal of communism as the basis for the new world order, positioning the United States to become a global economic hegemon in the twentieth century. 9 More historical consensus exists that Wilson's ideals left a lasting impact on American foreign policy, making the First World War a pivotal moment for understanding the new international role that the United States played in the twentieth century. "Wilsonianism should be seen not as a transient phenomenon, a reflection of some abstract idealism, but a potent definer of contemporary history" because it established the framework by which the United States redefined itself as a global power, Akira Iriye wrote in 1993. 10 Historians disagree, however, on whether Wilsonianism provided the foundation for the United States to do good or ill in the world. Whereas Cooper, Jr. credited Wilson with laying out fundamentally sound democratic values to guide future foreign policy, Lloyd E. Ambrosius lamented the birth of a destructive messianic impulse that would justify countless American interventions throughout the world in the twentieth century. 11 1944) , the first historian to work with records of the peace proceedings, censured Wilson for agreeing to exclude Germany from a peace process that made a mockery of his earlier demand for a "peace without victory." Klause Schwabe, Woodrow Wilson, Revolutionary Germany, and Peacemaking, 1918 -1919 (University of North Carolina Press, 1985 , believes that over the course of the peace negotiations Wilson changed his mind about the need to censure Germany. Wilson's key political mistake, Schwabe argues, was not explaining adequately to the American public why he believed Germany needed to accept responsibility for its wrongdoing before receiving a place in the League of Nations. 
Losing the peace

The Homefront
Most scholars who have written about the wartime home-front would only reluctantly call themselves historians of the First World War. Instead, they self-identify mainly as scholars with specialized interests in labour-capital relations, domestic reform movements, women's history, African American history, and civil liberties. These works connect the war-generated changes in American society to domestic trends preceding the war, situating these transformations within the context of U.S. history rather than a global framework. This "isolationist" approach to studying the war allows American historians to respond solely to each other, rarely taking into account the larger worldwide literature on the war's seminal impact.
The Economy
The war brought tremendous profits to America as trade with belligerent nations boomed and American businesses seized upon opportunities to move into markets (especially within Asia and South America) abandoned by the British. The war accelerated the process of integrating economies within the Western Hemisphere with America emerging as the regional hegemon. The position of the United States in the world economy also changed as exports increased, more goods travelled overseas on American merchant ships, and the United States became a major world creditor. The size and vigour of the domestic market, however, still continued to dazzle American businessmen more than the international. Mobilizing the American economy to support the war effort created a thriving economy fuelled by taxpayer dollars and war bond purchases. After a brief post-war recession, Americans "disproportionately employed their profits from the war years to fuel a spectacular expansion of the home economy, rather than extending still farther their position in the world economy," concludes David M. Kennedy. 13 American scholars have therefore focused primarily on tracing the domestic impact of wartime mobilization, tabulating economic winners and losers during a time of enormous profits, technological innovations, and government oversight. Immediately after the war, firsthand accounts by wartime administrators painted a glowing portrait of Americans pulling together voluntarily to win the war, downplaying issues of war profiteering or the array of financial incentives the government put in place to entice industrialists to fall in line with mobilization edicts. (See for example, Bernard Baruch, American Industry in the War: A Report of the War Industries Board, 1921) . This narrative of initial chaos giving way to eventual success remained in place until the 1960s when revisionist historians began to trace persistent economic inequities back to World War I. Rather than putting aside class antagonisms and ambitions to help the nation win the war, New Left historians argued that businessmen seized the opportunity to further their own economic interests. By serving on committees writing wartime regulations and volunteering to head wartime agencies as "dollar a year men," business elites succeeded in derailing the momentum of prewar Progressive regulatory reforms aimed at limiting monopolies and stemming the growing power of industrialists. Gabriel Kolko, James Weinstein, Paul Koistinen, and Melvyn Urofsky portrayed business as dictating the terms of wartime mobilization, with the government now a willing partner advancing their interests. 14 Robert Cuffalso challenged earlier accounts, albeit from a different direction. He examined "the gap between the rhetoric and reality," and concluded that wartime administrators tended to exaggerate their influence over the wartime economy. 15 The complex economic relationships between individual industries and government agencies, however, defied easy categorization. Some were harmonious, others contentious. Cuff's path-breaking study encouraged other business historians to examine the hodgepodge of personalities, strategies, and policies present during the economic mobilization. In the Cuff-inspired narrative, the lack of uniformity in how different industries mobilized prevented either the government or businessmen from gaining unilateral control of the wartime economy. 16 The most widely-read synthesis on the economic mobilization remains David M. Kennedy's Over Here: The First World War and American Society (NY: Oxford University Press, 1980). Kennedy amalgamated much previous work by the New Left and Cuff on the economic mobilization to argue that the war derailed the Progressive reform movement. Progressive reformers had built a reform agenda that relied on regulation to protect the public good. This mindset conditioned them to agree that wartime state needed extensive powers to mobilize American society efficiently and quickly. Kennedy argued that much to the Progressives' dismay, wartime economic mobilization also required renewed cooperation between the government and business. This government-business partnership ultimately undermined the Progressive regulatory approach to blunting the inequities of free market capitalism. Ellis Hawley's influential work, The Great War and the Search for a Modern Order: A History of the American People and Their Institutions, 1917 -1933 (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1979 ) put a more positive spin on this postwar business-governmental partnership. In his view government and business emerged from the war convinced that jointly-creating voluntary codes and guidelines offered a more harmonious path to managing the economy than regulation. Hawley's views still predominant, especially in works that detail the interwar economic policies of Herbert Hoover (as both Commerce Secretary and President). Recent studies on the institutional and behavioral legacy of economic mobilization have begun to tease out other lasting economic shifts. These works investigate the increased fiscal capacities of key state agencies, especially the Treasury Department, and the war's impact on the savings strategies of average citizens. Julia Ott suggests, for instance, that the public relations campaign to sell war bonds created a postwar "investor democracy" by schooling Americans in the value of investing their money in stocks and bonds. 17 Labor historians have also measured how the war affected the labor movement. At first, moderate unions experienced a short resurgence due to supportive federal policies that built maximum hours, minimum wages, and protection for unions into wartime contracts awarded to American businesses. They lost these rights, however, at the war's conclusion. 18 Scholarly works tracing radical labor groups (which often opposed the war) reveal how draconian state suppression and harassment eliminated radical political discourse in America for the next ten years. 19 
War Culture
The growth of federal power serves as the dominant theme for multiple genres of works tracing the impact of the war on American society. Among European historians the debate over coercion or consent refers mostly to questions over why men fought. Within the United States, the scholarly argument over coercion or consent centers primarily on whether citizens resisted or abetted the war-fueled expansion of state power. Collectively, this body of works presents the First World War as a pivotal moment in state-society relations for the United States. During World War I America broke with its previous tradition of relying mostly on volunteers and used conscription to raise the bulk of the wartime force. Press, 2008) implicates local civilians in this drive for political conformity, arguing that an under-staffed federal government needed the active and willing participation of local communities to enforce most of its wartime regulations. He coined the term "coercive voluntarism" to describe the enlistment of local civic groups in the campaign to ensure active compliance with wartime edicts on food conservation, liberty bond purchases, and curtailing dissent. Community leaders on the local and state level, Capozzola contends, helped the federal government create a culture of patriotic obligation that pressured citizens to provide the needed manpower, material, and food. Like labor historians, Capozzola sees the emergence of a permanent surveillance state that monitored and suppressed radical political expression as a crucial legacy of the war for modern America. Christopher Sterba disagrees that an empowered state was the war's primary legacy. In Good Americans: Italian and Jewish Immigrants during the First World War (NY: Oxford University Press, 2003), Sterba challenged the longstanding assumption that nativist demands for complete assimilation (100 % Americanism) defined the immigrant experience during the First World War. Instead, Sterba argued that Italian and Jewish immigrants, both on the homefront and overseas, used the war to assimilate into mainstream culture on their own terms. A mixture of concern for events in their homelands, a desire for recognition in their adopted country, and pride in their communities' wartime contributions fueled their willing participation as soldiers and civilians in the war effort. Undergoing their first sustained interaction with the federal government and native-born Americans, these immigrant communities would use their participation in wartime civic activities as a springboard for future political engagement. The idea that involvement in wartime mobilization served as a politicalizing experience forms the prevailing narrative in a host of works devoted to veterans, African Americans, and women. Implicit in all these works is the notion that wartime service (whether voluntary or coerced) created a social contract between the state and various sub-sets of the American population. Whether or not the state honored its side of the social contract helped to determine whether the war proved an aid or hindrance to the social justice campaigns mounted by these groups. Most recent studies also seek to balance an acknowledgement of the state's coercive power with a narrative that emphasizes individual agency and empowerment. In Doughboys, the Great War and the Remaking of America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001) I argued that conscription created a social compact between the state and conscripted soldiers that endured well after they returned home. Veterans argued that conscription, which deprived soldiers of their livelihoods, gave the state the responsibility to distribute the profits of war fairly. Returned servicemen focused on the large sums acquired by wartime manufactures, and successfully demanded that some of these profits be retroactively given to them. World War I veterans extended this argument into World War II to shape the modern system of veterans' benefits created with the GI Bill in 1944. In Beyond the Bonus March and GI Bill: How Veteran Politics Shaped the New Deal Era (NYU Press, 2010), Steve Ortiz argued that by critiquing the limits of Franklin D. Roosevelt's Depression-era New Deal policies, World War I veterans played a major role in redefining the larger social contract between all Americans and the federal government that ultimately led to old-age pensions and federal labor standards. Williams provides an extensive investigation postwar veteran political activism within the African American community, which left many frustrated with the lack of racial progress. Together, these works demonstrate how postwar veteran activism, not all of it successful, laid the groundwork for how activists would respond to the next world war. In several articles, I also trace how military service served as a vehicle for politicizing black soldiers by considering the structural, not just ideological, opportunities for soldiers to organize and how civil rights activists took up the banner of equal medical treatment for black veterans to advance the entire civil rights movement. 21 Jennifer D. Keene, "What Did It All Mean? The United States and World War I", Histoire@Politique. Politique, culture, société, n° 22, janvier-avril 2014 [en ligne, www.histoire-politique.fr] The 1920 ratification of the 19 th Amendment granting women the right to vote guaranteed the First World War a prominent place in historical works voted to the suffrage movement. 22 Unlike African Americans, female activists successfully convinced male politicians that the wartime social contract required rewarding women with the vote for their loyal service on the homefront. "We have made partners of the women in this war. Shall we admit them only to a partnership of suffering and sacrifice and toil and not to a partnership of privilege and right?" proclaimed Wilson in announcing his support of a constitutional amendment granting female suffrage. 23 Another line of inquiry examines the leadership roles that politically mobilized women assumed within local communities. Capozzola and Lentz-Smith, for instance, discuss how middle-class women (who belonged to an array of social clubs) became essential grassroots organizers mobilizing white and black communities across the nation to support the war. The laurels bestowed on working-class women for their tireless sacrifice and volunteer activities, Capozzola argues, simply camouflaged state-sanctioned exploitation of unpaid female laborers. Julia America, 1919 -1933 , NYU Press, 2010 ) echoes this theme with her discussion of the government's willingness at the height of the Great Depression to fund pilgrimages for mothers and widows to visit their fallen soldiers' overseas graves. War (NY: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931) . This autobiography argued forcefully that under Pershing's command the American army became an elite force that won the war for the Allies along the Western Front. Feeling slighted by Pershing, Pershing's chief of staff Peyton March, The Nation at War (NY Garden City, Doubleday, 1932), wrote his own memoir that severely criticized Pershing's leadership but did not challenge the central role that the United States played in the conflict. These early accounts essentially set the parameters for the scholarly debate over how effectively Pershing led and the American Army fought. History, 1997) , Kenneth Hamburger also praised the AEF for studying its mistakes and correcting them in time to win the war. Other scholars built upon March's more critical appraisal of the American war effort. A revisionist school in the 1980s and 1990s viewed the high U.S. casualty rate as a sign of poor leadership, rather than a necessary part of the army's learning curve. Timothy K. Nenninger and Paul Braim argued that AEF commanders made key mistakes that affected training, supply lines, and strategic decisions. 24 James W. Rainey was scathing in his assessment of AEF doctrine, training, and combat performance. "In having to grope its way to victory, the AEF succeeded not because of imaginative operations and tactics nor because of qualitative superiority in open warfare, but rather by smothering German machine guns with American flesh," Rainey wrote. 25 Pershing had lauded his success in resisting Allied demands that he allow the British and French to amalgamate American soldiers into their armies. Pershing's triumph was creating an independent American army that controlled its own sector of the Western Front. David Trask, The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918 (Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995) included only one chapter on World War I, reflecting the still limited scholarly interest in the topic. Piehler suggested that memorialization in the 1920s took a utilitarian turn, with Americans choosing to remember the war by building edifices that improved community civic life. Dedicating these structures to the memory of those who lost their lives trying to spread democracy in "the war to end all wars" offered physical evidence of community progress which countered claims that these men had died in vain. Distance from the event, however, dimmed the connection that average American made between the war and eating their lunch in a Pershing Square or driving on an Argonne Street. It is only in the last few years that American scholars have finally joining the decadeslong conversation among European scholars on memory and mourning. This is now one of the promising and exciting areas of new scholarship, one that focuses on both how Americans remembered and why they forgot. Like Piehler, Lisa Budreau documented an "American way of remembrance," that reflected American political and cultural values. She focused on the controversies surrounding the burial of American war dead, especially the debate over whether a dead soldier became a private citizen or remained in service of the state. 28 Press, 2012) attempt to recover what they consider a "lost memory" of the war. To explain why Americans forgot the devastating consequences of the influenza epidemic so quickly forgotten, Byerly and Bristow contend that American society privileged optimism and progress. Within this cultural environment sustained despair and grief were culturally unacceptable. Americans never intentionally purged the war from their collective consciousness, according to Steven Trout. 29 Instead, different groups of Americans remembered the war in too many diverse ways, preventing a unifying national narrative of the war's significance from taking root. Popular memory-makers (novelists, playwrights, poets) often borrowed from British modes of memory that emphasized the horrors of trench warfare, a trope that resonated poorly with American veterans who saw the war as reaffirming their valour and the exceptionalism of the United States. Not all Americans forgot the war quickly. The above discussion summarized how war memoires fueled veteran political activism. Memory of the war also remained strong within the African American community. Besides energizing the postwar civil rights movements, the war heavily influenced the art, prose, and poetry produced by Harlem Renaissance artists. Mark Whalen argues that this war-inspired cultural response, when put alongside the new political militancy, demonstrates how African Americans attached an empowering narrative to their memory of the war. Their sense of betrayal, rather than leading to paralyzing disillusionment, instead emboldened African Americans to innovate with new art forms and political strategies. 30
Fighting the War
My Experiences in the World
Conclusion
Competing memories of the war reflected existing political and social divisions within American society during the twenties and thirties, as Americans differed on whether the war's impact should be celebrated or condemned. Did the war signify triumph or tragedy; equality or discrimination; humanitarianism or imperialism; voluntarism or coercion; democracy or oppression? These questions are still with us, along with some new ones. American scholars have just begun to investigate the wide-range of American responses to the war during the period of neutrality, calling into question whether 1917 is even the right date for marking American entry into the war. Similarly, the new work on disabled soldiers questions when the war ended for the individual soldier. Old questions or new, in many respects every scholarly account of the war written since its conclusion tries to offer a clear, compelling case for why the 
